This papers shows that the hedging premium associated with currency risk management declines as more competitors choose to hedge foreign exchange exposure. Likewise, choosing to remain unhedged hurts value more if many competitors have hedged currency exposure. Not surprisingly then, firms are more likely to hedge currency risk if their exposure is larger than the industry average, and if hedging is more common among competitors. These strategic factors appear to be more important for firms' hedging decisions than some firm-specific factors highlighted by existing theory, and point towards the need to re-think currency risk management in an industry equilibrium setting. 
A large body of research, both theoretical and empirical, examines firms' incentives to engage in risk-management. Existing theories suggest that firms undertake risk-management in order to reduce expected taxes, financial distress costs and underinvestment problems. Empirical studies, which mostly use corporate derivatives usage as a proxy for risk-management, find that hedgers do not clearly fit the profile of any one theory. In fact, cross-sectional evidence regarding most theoretical predictions about the incentives to hedge is mixed. Moreover, in a case study of a large foreign exchange hedger, Brown (2001) finds that traditional explanations for why a firm would use derivatives to manage hedgeable risk do not capture the primary incentives of the firm under question to hedge. Rather, a stated goal of the firm's currency hedging program is to reduce negative impacts from currency movements on competitiveness. Hedging allows the firm to undertake competitive pricing and obtain significant competitive advantage in the product market during adverse exchange rate shocks. In a similar vein, Allayannis and Weston (1999) show that firms that operate in industries with lower mark-ups are more likely to engage in foreign currency risk management in order to remain competitive during foreign exchange shocks. If hedging foreign exchange risk provides firms with a strategic advantage, it is natural to expect that the advantage will be contingent on whether the firm's competitors also face foreign exchange exposure and whether they engage in foreign currency risk management. However, neither the current theoretical nor empirical literature provides an analysis of how hedging impacts competitiveness or how the hedging behavior of competitors affects a firm's decision to hedge.
In this paper, I provide the first broad sample evidence on how competitors' hedging strategies affect the incentives of a firm to hedge foreign exchange risk and the benefits it derives from hedging. I use comprehensive, hand-collected data on the usage of foreign currency derivatives in the U.S. that allow me to determine how many firms in an industry face exchange rate exposure, how many of those use foreign currency derivatives and the size of their derivatives portfolios. I show that the benefits of hedging, or the disadvantage of remaining unhedged, depend critically on whether the firm's competitors also hedge foreign exchange risk.
Specifically, the hedging premium declines as more competitors of a firm choose to hedge. For example, if half of the firm's competitors who face exchange rate exposure engage in currency risk-management, the hedging premium is 19 percent. If three-quarters of the competitors use currency derivatives, the hedging premium is 9 percent. However, the premium disappears altogether if all of a firms competitors are hedged against exchange rate exposure.
The statements above are equivalent to saying that the value discount resulting from not hedging currency risk is larger if many competitors choose to reduce exposure to foreign exchange risk. Not surprisingly then, the incentives of a firm to hedge exchange rate risk are also related to the hedging strategies of competitors. I find that the decision to hedge depends on a firm's exposure relative to its industry and to the fraction of competitors who are also hedging foreign currency risk. There is some evidence of 'safety in conformity' in that firms are more likely to hedge if their competitors are hedging and are more likely to hedge if their own exposure is significantly larger than the industry average. Controlling for industry characteristics, a one percent increase in the fraction of competitors who hedge currency risk results in an 18 percent increase in the probability that a firm will engage in currency risk-management. Moreover, a one percent increase in firm foreign sales relative to industry foreign sales results in a 3 percent increase in the probability that a firm will hedge currency risk. Hedging by competitors and relative-to-industry foreign sales also have a significantly positive effect on the amount of currency derivatives held by a firm. These results suggest that advantages of foreign exchange risk-management and, thus, a firm's decision to engage in risk management cannot be considered independently of competitors' exposure and hedging practices. This paper is the first to provide evidence that foreign exchange hedging depends not only on a firm's own exposure, usually measured in terms of foreign sales, but also on the exposures faced by its competitors and on the hedging decisions of competing firms. Results in this paper indicate that strategic factors are more important for firms' hedging decisions than some firm-specific factors highlighted by existing theory and points towards the need to re-think currency risk management in an industry equilibrium setting.
I address the concerns of Guay and Kothari (2003) that derivatives hedging constitutes too small a part of firms' risk-management activity to have a significant affect on firm value.
Guay and Kothari show that the median firm's derivatives portfolio pays off a small amount relative to the firm's operating and investing cash flows and hence appears to be a small piece of a non-financial firm's overall risk profile. They argue that if derivatives hedging is only a small component of a firm's overall risk-management activity, then the mixed results documented in the literature are understandable. They also call into question the findings that derivatives usage has economically significant effects on firm value. I explicitly control for the importance of a firm's currency derivatives portfolio using Guay and Kothari's (2003) portfolio sensitivity measure and find that a hedging increases firm value only for firms whose derivatives portfolios hedge a significant portion of firm value. This suggests that Guay and Kothari's concern that the importance of the derivatives portfolio should be controlled for when studying the impact on firm value is justified. Nonetheless, the main findings of my paper remain unchanged. The hedging premium declines with the frequency of derivative usage by competitors.
Finally, I confirm the findings of Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2003) that derivatives users are valued higher conditional on good corporate governance. Hedging adds value only for firms with good corporate governance, measured by the presence of a large blockholder. However, as before, the value effect of hedging is contingent on whether immediate rivals have also hedged away exchange rate exposure. Thus, the findings of this paper are very robust and support the notion that firms engage in optimal industry risk-reduction.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides an overview of past research on risk-management. Section II discusses the potential role of competitors' hedging decisions on the incentives of a firm to hedge currency risk and the benefits it derives from hedging. Section III describes the data, variables and methodology. Section IV describes univariate and multivariate tests. Section V addresses robustness of results. Section VI concludes.
I. Prior Research on the Use of Derivatives
Research on derivatives usage has largely focused on understanding why firms hedge.
Prior research has suggested different theories, most of which rely on capital market imperfections, to explain a firm's incentives to hedge. Corporate hedging can be optimal if it reduces the risk premium demanded by managers, and likewise reduces required compensation. Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that a risk-averse manager who owns a large number of the firm's shares will direct the firm to hedge when he believes that it is cheaper for the firm to hedge than it is for him to hedge the risk on his own account. In contrast, when managers own stock options, the value of which increases with firm volatility, they are less likely to engage in riskmanagement. Tufano (1996) , Schrand and Unal (1998) and Knopf, Nam and Thornton (2002) find evidence consistent with managerial incentives. In contrast, Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Haushalter (2000) do not find evidence that managerial risk aversion or shareholdings affect corporate hedging.
Other theories (e.g. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) ), suggest that hedging can reduce underinvestment problems (Myers (1977) ). Evidence on the underinvestment theory is also mixed. Since the underinvestment problem is the most severe for firms with valuable investment opportunities, studies have used research and development (R&D) expense and market-to-book as explanatory variables. Mian (1996) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) find no relation between market-to-book and hedging. Several papers, however, find that R&D expense increases a firm's incentive to hedge (e.g. Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) , Dolde (1995) ). Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that hedging can increase firm value by reducing the probability of financial distress. Many papers use the debt ratio to measure deadweight costs of financial distress and find that hedging increases with the debt ratio (e.g. Graham and Rogers (2002) , Dolde (1995) , Purnanandam (2004) ). Others, however, find no evidence or mixed evidence for the relationship between hedging and leverage (e.g. Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) , Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) ). Smith and Stulz (1985) also suggest that firms might hedge in response to tax function convexity. Unfortunately, evidence regarding this incentive is also unclear. For example, Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) find that firms that hedge face more convex tax functions. Graham and Rogers (2002) , on the other hand, use a more refined measure of tax function convexity and find no relationship between hedging and tax function convexity.
While evidence about why firms hedge is mixed and does not support any one theory, recent studies show that derivatives usage has significant effects on firm value. Allayannis and Weston (2001) find that the use of foreign currency derivatives increases total firm value by as much as 4.78 percent on average. Graham and Rogers (2002) document a positive relationship between derivatives use and debt capacity and argue that derivatives-induced debt capacity increases firm value by 1.1 percent on average. Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2003) the hedging premium is statistically significant and economically large for firms that have strong internal and external corporate governance. Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2003) investigate jet fuel hedging and conclude that hedging is associated with higher firm value by 12 to 16 percent, possibly due to the reduction of underinvestment costs. Finally, Bartram, Brown and Fehle (2003) find that interest rate hedging increases firm value by 4 to 9 percent. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) argue that hedging enables firms to transfer cash from states of the world in which they have surplus to those in which cash is scarce. Thus, hedging allows firms to pursue profitable investments during periods in which funds would have, in the absence of hedging, fallen below the amount required to invest. Consider an industry where a few firms are exposed to foreign exchange shocks but only one of the firms undertakes foreign exchange risk management. In the face of an exchange rate shock, cash flows of the unhedged firms fall below the amount required for investment. Insofar as external finance is costly and harder to obtain when performance is poor, the hedged firm has a comparative advantage over its rivals in that it can pursue profitable investments during periods of adverse exchange rate shocks.
II. The role of competitors' hedging decisions
The hedged firm may also be able to pursue more aggressive pricing while maintaining profit margins. However, this comparative advantage is likely to diminish if some of the firm's competitors also choose to hedge. This is because, by virtue of being hedged, more firms will have sufficient funds during an exchange rate shock to compete for the limited profitable investment opportunities and to pursue aggressive pricing. This argument suggests that, if there is a premium to hedging, the premium will decline as more firms in an industry choose to hedge.
The diminishing marginal benefit of hedging might lead one to think that a firm's incentive to hedge declines as more of its competitors choose to hedge. Such a conclusion would be premature. This is because choosing to remain unhedged when most competitors have hedged away exchange rate exposure may have drawbacks of its own. For one, the unhedged firm could end up as one of the few firms unable to pursue positive NPV projects during adverse exchange rate shocks. Thus, hedging may switch from being a strategic advantage to a strategic necessity as more competitors engage in risk management.
There may also be safety in conformity. Brown (2001) refers to analysts who admit than any material impact of foreign exchange risk on profit margins would be viewed negatively. With this in mind it is not difficult to see how hedging by competitors may increase a firm's incentives to hedge. Analysts often evaluate a company's performance relative to its competitors. If many firms in an industry have similar exposure to exchange rates and together suffer a similar decline in margins due to an adverse exchange rate shock, then any one firm is unlikely to be singled out and penalized by analysts for not being hedged. However, if any one firm's exposure is significantly larger than that of its competitors, it will be susceptible to a noticeably larger drop in margins than that of its competitors. Moreover, as more firms in an industry choose to insulate themselves against exchange rate exposure, any adverse effects of exchange rate shocks on the profit margins of an unhedged firm will be particularly noticeable and more likely to be penalized. This suggests that a firm's incentive to hedge will be higher if its foreign exchange exposure is significantly higher than that of its competitors (causing it to suffer more during adverse shocks) and if more of its rivals are hedged.
Previous literature has touched upon the influence competition might have on riskmanagement of firms. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) suggest that risk-management is part of an optimal investment strategy where firms may hedge less if their competitors hedge more, as long as investment is a strategic substitute. Allayannis and Ihrig (2001) develop a model in which firms in more competitive industries have an increased exposure to exchange rates. In a related study, Allayannis and Weston (1999) find that firms in more competitive (low mark-up) industries are more likely to hedge foreign exchange risk.
Although these papers suggest that competitive considerations might affect hedging incentives, none of these papers have explored how the hedging strategies of competitors affect the advantage a firm derives from hedging or the incentives of a firm to hedge. This is partly due to the fact that previous studies have tended to use small, sometimes randomly selected samples which do not have complete information on hedging by all competitors. In this paper, I use handcollected, comprehensive derivatives risk-management data for all publicly listed firms in the US.
The data allow me to capture, fairly accurately, how many firms in an industry face exchange rate exposure, how many of those choose to hedge exchange rate risk, what types of instruments they use, and how much they hedge.
Using this unique data, I address questions that arise from the discussion above. Are 
III. Derivatives Data, Variable Description and Methodology
Sample Selection I obtain data on currency derivative holdings of public U.S. as of 1998-1999. I do this by searching the financial footnotes and Management Discussion and Analysis of SEC 10-K filings for text strings such as "hedg," "swap," "cap," "forward" etc. SFAS 105 requires all firms to report information about financial instruments with off balance sheet risk for fiscal years ending after June 15, 1990. In particular firms are required to report the notional amounts of the financial instruments used. If a reference is made to any of the search terms and the firm is not a financial firm, I read the surrounding text to confirm that it refers to derivatives holdings and classify the firm as foreign currency derivatives (FCD) user in that year. I collect the gross notional amounts of foreign exchange forwards, swaps and options outstanding as of fiscal year ending in 1999. In cases where there were no contracts outstanding as of fiscal year end but the firm did engage in foreign exchange risk-management during the year, I take the notional amounts that expired during the year 1998-1999. If there are no references to the keywords, I classify the firm as an FCD non-user in that year. I match this database with COMPUSTAT and retain all non-financial firms that have positive values for net sales, total assets and market value of equity. Out of the 6,389 firms that meet these criteria, I study 3,259 firms that face ex-ante exchange rate exposure as defined below. Out of these 3,259 firms, 548 firms engage in foreign exchange risk management.
An advantage of this comprehensive sample is that it enables me to determine, for each firm, how many competitors who face exchange rate exposure choose to hedge, as well as how much competitors hedge. Most previous studies on foreign exchange hedging have either focused on a single industry or have used sample-selection criteria that do not give a complete picture of hedging activity in any given industry. For example, Allayannis and Weston (2001) use a sample of non-financial firms that have total assets of more than 500 million in each year between 1990 and 1995. Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) study Fortune 500 non-financial firms. Graham and Rogers (2002) use a randomly selected sample of non-financial firms. My sample, on the other hand, is more representative of the universe of firms.
Throughout this paper, I focus on firms that face ex-ante exchange rate exposure. This allows me to interpret the absence of derivatives usage as a choice not to use derivatives, rather than an indication of lack of exposure to foreign exchange risk. Following Graham and Rogers (2002) , I define firms to have ex-ante currency exposure if they disclose foreign assets, sales or income in the COMPUSTAT Geographic segment file, or disclose positive values of foreign currency adjustment, exchange rate effect, foreign income, or deferred foreign taxes in the annual COMPUSTAT files. As mentioned above, 3,259 firms from the initial sample of 6,389 (fifty-one percent) face ex-ante exchange rate exposure. The gross notional amounts of foreign exchange swaps, forwards and options outstanding are summarized in Table I The mean notional amount of swaps, forwards and options scaled by total assets are 4.90 percent, 7.80 percent and 6.35 percent respectively. These numbers are comparable to those reported by Purnanandam (2004) who also uses a more comprehensive sample to study derivatives usage. Table I reports the frequency and amount of derivatives usage by industry.
Panel B of
Industry classification is based on Campbell (1996) . Currency derivatives usage is the most frequent in the food and tobacco, textiles and capital goods industries where respectively 24 percent, 23 percent and 22 percent of companies are derivative users. The frequency of derivatives usage in my sample is lower than that reported by Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and Weston (2001) . This is because these papers limit their sample to large firms where as mine includes many small and medium sized firms that do not use currency derivatives.
Two caveats are necessary here. First, the gross notional value represents derivative ownership and may not accurately estimate derivatives hedging if a firm holds offsetting contracts. Graham and Rogers (2002) collect both gross and net notional amounts for their sample and conclude that using net as opposed to gross positions is only marginally important in helping identify factors that affect corporate hedging decisions. Second, derivative holdings may measure speculative activity, not hedging. SFAS 119 requires firms to explicitly state whether they speculate with derivatives. I exclude firms that claim to use derivatives for trading purposes and thus classify any firm using foreign currency derivatives as a 'hedger'.
Description of Variables
In this section, I describe the primary variables of interest as well as all control variables.
As in Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2003) , I use Tobin's Q as a measure of firm value. It is equal to the market value of equity (price times shares outstanding from CRSP) plus assets minus the book value of equity, all divided by assets. Book value of equity is equal to common equity plus deferred taxes. A firm's hedging decision is captured by a dummy that equals one if the firm uses foreign exchange swaps, forwards or options. Competitors hedging activity is captured by the fraction of competitors with the same three-digit SIC code who disclose the use of foreign currency derivatives. Specifically, it is equal to the number of competitors who face exchange rate exposure and disclose the use currency swaps, forwards or options divided by the total number of competitors who face foreign exchange exposure. A firm's foreign exchange exposure relative to its competitors is calculated as firm foreign sales less industry mean foreign sales all divided by total assets of the firm.
When estimating the effect of the hedging decision on firm value, I control for factors that have been known to impact firm value. Previous studies have shown that firm value is affected by growth opportunities, size, leverage, profitability and industrial diversification. I use research and development expense over sales as a proxy for growth opportunities. Log of total assets serves as the measure of firm size. Leverage is calculated as total long-term debt divided by total assets. Return on assets serves as a proxy for profitability and is calculated as net income over total assets. Industrial diversification is captured with a dummy that equals one if a firm operates in more than one segment and zero otherwise. To reduce the influence of outliers, Q, long-term debt ratio, research and development expense, and return on assets are winsorized at the 1% level.
In the hedging-decision regressions, I control for factors that, according to existing research, create incentives for a firm to hedge. Firms are more likely to hedge if they have a greater exposure to exchange rate fluctuations. The extent of foreign exchange exposure is captured by total foreign sales divided by net sales. Theory suggests that firms hedge to reduce tax function convexity. As in most previous research, I measure tax function convexity with net operating loss carryforwards scaled by total assets. More liquid firms are less likely to need riskmanagement. I control for this by including current assets over current liabilities as an explanatory variable. Derivatives usage is associated with economies of scale in that larger firms more likely to engage in risk management. Thus, I include log of total assets as an explanatory variable. According to existing theory, firms hedge to reduce costs of underinvestment and financial distress. I use the long-term debt ratio as a proxy for financial distress. I also use the square of the long-term debt ratio as an explanatory variable because Purnanandam (2004) finds that leverage has non-linear affects on hedging. Since underinvestment costs are likely to be the most severe for firms that have more growth options, I include research and development expense as an explanatory factor. Smith and Stulz (1985) predict a positive relation between managerial stock holding and derivatives use, but a negative relation between managerial option holding and derivative use. This is because risk-averse managers who have a lot of wealth invested in the firm through stock ownership may direct the firm to hedge if it is more expensive to hedge on their own accounts. On the other hand, expected utility of managerial wealth can be a convex function of the firm's expected profits when managers own stock options. In this case, managers may choose to increase the risk of the firm in order to increase the value of their options. To control for managerial incentives, I include two variables. The first is the market value of stocks owned by the executives of the firm and the second is the Black-Scholes value of the options held by executives of a firm. DeMarzo and Duffie (1991) suggest that firms that face more information asymmetry are more likely to hedge. Since large firms are known to face less information asymmetry, these theories would predict that large firms are less likely to hedge. However, as mentioned before, large firms are more likely to hedge due to economies of scales. To distinguish these factors, I use alternative proxies for economies of scale and information asymmetry. If there are economies of scale in hedging, firms are more likely to engage in foreign exchange risk management if they also use other type of derivatives instruments like interest rate derivatives. Therefore, I use interest rate hedging dummy that equals one if a firm discloses the use of interest rate derivatives as a proxy for economies of scale. As in previous studies, I use institutional ownership as a proxy for information asymmetry. If firms owned primarily by institutional owners face less informational asymmetry, then the theory of DeMarzo and Duffie implies that firms with more institutional ownership should be less likely to engage in foreign exchange risk management.
It is clear that some variables that are expected to affect the hedging decision also impact firm value. Thus, any regression with Q as the dependent variable and the hedging decision as an independent variable will suffer from endogeneity. The estimation methodology used to control for endogeneity in the Q regressions is described below.
Methodology
I examine the effect of currency derivative hedging on firm value by modeling firm value Managerial option holdings are relevant for the hedging decision but unlikely to be correlated with the error in equation (1) and, thus, make consistent estimates of 2 δ possible. 
IV-A. Univariate Tests

IV-B Multivariate Tests
Use of derivatives and firm value
In order to document a relationship between the use of derivatives and firm value, I need to control for other variables that could affect Q. In this section, I use a multivariate setting which controls for size, research and development expenditure, leverage, industrial diversification, profitability and industry characteristics. The primary explanatory variables of interest are the currency hedging dummy and the interaction of the hedging dummy with the fraction of competitors who use currency derivatives. Since the characteristics that make a firm choose to hedge may also be correlated with firm value, I implement an endogenous self-selection model that uses Heckman's correction to control for the self-selection bias induced by a firm's decision to engage in foreign currency hedging. Results are presented in Table III .
Panel A of Table III shows that the self-selection parameter, lambda, is -0.18 and significant at the 1 percent level. This indicates the prevalence of self-selection and suggests that characteristics that make firms choose to hedge are negatively correlated with firm value.
Regression results indicate that firms that use currency derivatives have a significantly higher value than firms that do not use currency derivatives. This is consistent with the findings of Allyannis and Weston (2001) and Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2003) . However, the significantly negative coefficient on the interaction of the derivative user dummy with the fraction of competitors who hedge suggests that the hedging premium declines with the fraction of competitors who engage in currency risk management. suggests that the market punishes a firm that has unhedged foreign exposure, and punishes it more if it is one of a few firms in the industry with unhedged foreign exchange risk. Thus, a firm's incentives to hedge will increase as more of its competitors engage in currency risk management and if its exposure is significantly higher than that of its competitors. I test this prediction in the next section. Before moving to the next section, I note that as expected, Q is higher for firms with greater growth opportunities and for firms that are more profitable. It is smaller for larger firms, firms with higher leverage and for diversified firms.
The decision to hedge
In this section I test the implications of the previous section. Particularly I test whether a firm is more likely to hedge if its competitors hedge and if its exposure is significantly larger than that of its competitors. I estimate a logit model to distinguish between the possible explanations for derivatives use. Since recent studies have estimated censored tobit regressions with the notional value of derivatives contracts as the dependent variable, I also estimate a tobit model to make my results comparable with existing studies.
The differences in derivatives usage across industries (Table I) suggest that there may be industry specific characteristics that affect foreign exchange exposure of all firm's in an industry.
Ideally, these industry specific characteristics should be controlled for. In the regressions of this section, one of the main explanatory variables of interest, the fraction of competitors who engage in currency risk-management, is an industry level variable. Therefore, including industry fixed effects will induce multicollinearity in the regression and make it difficult to isolate the impact of rivals' hedging decision. In this regressions presented here I do not control for industry effects.
However, in the robustness section, I attempt to control for industry characteristics on the decision to hedge in a manner that minimizes potential multicollinearity.
Table IV presents the logit coefficients and implied marginal changes in probability of using derivative instruments. The dependent variable is equal to one for currency derivative users In Panel A, I find that a firm is significantly more likely to use currency derivatives if a higher fraction of its competitors do so as well. A one percent increase in the fraction of competitors who hedge yields a statistically significant increase of 41 percent in the probability that a firm uses currency derivatives. This number should be viewed with caution since I have not controlled for industry characteristics that make it more likely that hedgers belong to industries that are more exposed to foreign exchange rate risk. Later in the paper, I show that once industry characteristics are controlled for, a one percent increase in the fraction of competitors who hedge yields a significant 18 percent increase in the probability that a firm uses currency derivatives.
The same table shows that a firm is more likely to hedge if its foreign sales are significantly higher than the industry mean foreign sales. A one percent increase in a firm's foreign sales relative to the mean industry foreign sales results in a significant three percent increase in the probability that a firm uses currency derivatives. Thus, the logit results support the implications of the previous sections that a firm's incentives to hedge is increasing in its exposure relative to relative to that of competitors and in the fraction of competitors who engage in risk management.
Consistent with previous studies, I find that a firm is more likely to hedge if it has more foreign sales and if it is larger. The positive coefficient on size supports the economies-of-scale argument for hedging rather than the information asymmetry argument. As in Tufano (1996) firms are significantly less likely to hedge if the managers' option holdings are larger. This provides support for the notion that managers who own options prefer not to reduce firm volatility. Managerial stock holding is not significant, thus I find only partial support for the hypothesis that managerial incentives determine firms' risk-management decisions. Noticeably, growth opportunities, financial distress and tax incentives (proxied by research and development expense, leverage and loss carry forward respectively) are not significant determinants of a firm's decision to engage in foreign exchange risk management. However, the economies-of-scale hypothesis is supported by the positive coefficient on the interest rate hedging dummy. Firms hedge more if their exposure is larger than the industry mean and if currency derivative usage is more common among their competitors. Larger firms and firms with greater foreign sales hedge more. The amount of foreign currency derivatives held by competitors is not relevant for how much a firm hedges. Although managerial option holding is associated with a lower probability of hedging, it is not relevant for the amount of currency derivatives held by a firm.
Size, foreign sales and relative-to-industry exposure are the primary determinants how much firms hedge.
The logit and tobit regressions both support the implications of the Q-regressions in the previous section. Choosing to remain unhedged hurts firm value more if many competitors have hedged exchange rate exposure. Thus, firms are more likely to use currency derivatives if their exposure is larger than the industry mean and if hedging is more common among competitors 1 .
Research and development expense, leverage and tax loss carry forwards do not significantly affect the probability of foreign exchange hedging or the amount of currency derivatives contracts held by firms. These findings indicate that strategic factors are more important for a firm's hedging decision than some of the factors proposed by existing theory.
V. Robustness
In this section, I address three issues. First, Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2004) show that currency hedging is associated with a premium only in firms with strong corporate governance. I
confirm their findings and demonstrate that hedging by competitors continues to have a significant negative effect on the hedging premium. Second, I address the concerns of Guay and Kothari (2003) that derivatives hedging constitutes too small a part of firms' risk-management activity to have a significant impact on firm value. Third, I attempt to control for the possibility that industry characteristics other than competitors' hedging activity may affect a firm's decision to hedge.
Corporate Governance
Using a broad sample of firms from 43 countries, Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2003) show that the hedging premium is statistically and economically significant for firms with strong corporate governance, such as those with a large outside blockholder, and insignificant for firms with weak 
Importance of derivatives risk-management
For a sample of 234 large non-financial firms, Guay and Kothari (2003) (Table VII) indicate that, as expected, hedgers in the Low Portfolio Sensitivity sample are not valued higher than nonhedgers. In contrast, hedgers in the High Portfolio Sensitivity sample are valued significantly higher than non-hedgers. These findings suggest that Guay and Kothari's concern that the importance of the derivatives portfolio should be controlled for when studying the impact on firm value is justified.
More importantly, I note that my findings survive the Guay and Kothari criticism. The hedging premium in the High Portfolio Sensitivity Premium declines with the fraction of competitors using currency derivatives. This is equivalent to a statement that derivatives nonusers trade at a discount relative to firms with significant derivatives usage and the discount increases as more competitors undertake derivatives hedging programs.
Controlling for industry
It is evident from Table I that the frequency of derivatives usage varies significantly across industries. This variation could reflect industry-specific characteristics associated with increased foreign exchange exposure which are not completely captured by a firm's own foreign sales. These factors should be controlled for in the logit estimates of the likelihood of currency derivatives usage. This poses a problem since the primary variable of interest in my regressions, the fraction of competitors who use currency derivatives, is an industry level variable in that it is (almost) identical for all firms with the same 3-digit SIC code. Since other industry characteristics may affect firm value I put in industry dummies in a manner that limits multicollinearity. As in Campbell (1996) I group firms into 12 industries based on the 2-digit SIC code. Details of this classification are provided in Table I hedging yields an 18 percent increase in the probability that a firm uses currency derivatives. The effect of relative-to-industry exposure is also significant. A one percent increase in the fraction of competitors who hedge results in a 2 percent increase in the probability that a firm engages in currency risk-management. Thus, the primary results of this paper survive controls for other industry level incentives to hedge.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, I examine how the foreign exchange exposure and currency risk management of competing firms affect a firm's own decision to hedge currency risk and the value benefits it derives from hedging. While previous research suggests that competitive factors may lead to optimal hedging strategies, none of the existing studies account for competitors hedging behavior when examining the hedging premium or a firm's hedging decision.
Using comprehensive data on currency risk management by publicly listed U.S. firms that face foreign exchange exposure, I show that currency derivative users are valued higher than non users. However, the 'hedging premium' enjoyed by a derivatives user declines with the frequency of derivatives usage by competing firms. Likewise, firms that choose not to hedge foreign exchange exposure are penalized more by the market if many competitors choose to reduce exposure using currency derivatives. Consistent with this, I find that firms are more likely to engage in foreign currency risk management if their exposure is larger than the industry average and if a higher fraction of their competitors choose to reduce exposure to currency risk.
These strategic factors are robust and appear to more important for currency risk-management than firm specific factors suggested by existing theory. Thus, this paper suggests that a firm's hedging incentives cannot be considered independently of competitors exposure and hedging strategies and points towards the need to re-think currency risk management in an industry equilibrium setting.
TABLE I Descriptive Statistics of Foreign Currency Derivative Use
This table summarizes foreign currency derivatives (FCD) usage as of fiscal year 1998-1999 by 548 U.S. firms that face ex-ante exchange rate exposure. A firm is defined as having exchange rate exposure if it discloses foreign assets, sales or income in the COMPUSTAT Geographic segment file, or discloses positive values of foreign currency adjustment, exchange rate effect, foreign income, or deferred foreign taxes in the annual COMPUSTAT files. All data are from 10-K disclosures. Panel A gives mean, 25 th percentile, median and 75 th percentile of total FCD usage as well as a break up by type of derivative (swaps, forwards and options). The table provides total notional amounts as well as notional amounts scaled by book value of total assets (TA). Panel B provides, by industry, the number of FCD users, non-users and fraction of FCD users along with the mean and median notional amounts held by FCD users in each industry. Industry classification is based on Campbell (1996) . All values are in dollar millions. 
TABLE II, Panel A Summary Characteristics of Derivative Users and Non-Users
Selected summary statistics for managerial and financial characteristics for firms that disclose the use of foreign currency derivatives (FCD users), and firms that do not (FCD non-users) in the 1998-1999 10Ks. All firms in the sample face ex-ante exchange rate exposure. A firm is defined as having ex-ante exchange rate exposure if it discloses foreign assets, sales or income in the COMPUSTAT Geographic segment file, or discloses positive values of foreign currency adjustment, exchange rate effect, foreign income, or deferred foreign taxes in the annual COMPUSTAT files. Size is the log of total assets in $ millions. Long Term Debt Ratio is long term debt divided by total assets. Manager Stockholding is the log of market value of the shares owned by the executives of the company. Manager Optionholding is the log of Black-Scholes value of the options held by the executives of the company. NOL carryforwards/TA is the net operating loss carry forwards scaled by book value of assets. Tobin's Q is market value of equity (calculated as shares outstanding times share price) plus total assets less common equity and deferred taxes, all scaled by book value of assets. Relative Exposure is the firm's foreign exchange exposure relative to the industry and is calculated as firm foreign sales minus the 3-digit industry mean foreign sales all divided by assets. Fraction of rivals who use FCD is calculated as the number of firms with the same 3-digit SIC code who face exchange rate exposure and disclose the use currency swaps, forwards or options divided by the total number of firms with the same 3-digit SIC who face foreign exchange exposure. In case of missing data, the number of observations is given in parenthesis. The t-statistics are for tests of equality of means between currency derivative users and nonusers. The p-values are in parenthesis. This table presents the log of Tobin's Q for foreign currency derivative (FCD) users and non-users split by the fraction of competitors at the 3-digit SIC level who also use FCD. All firms in the sample face ex-ante exchange rate exposure. A firm is defined as having ex-ante exchange rate exposure if it discloses foreign assets, sales or income in the COMPUSTAT Geographic segment file, or discloses positive values of foreign currency adjustment, exchange rate effect, foreign income, or deferred foreign taxes in the annual COMPUSTAT files. An FCD User is a firm that discloses the use of foreign currency swaps, options or forwards in its 1998-1999 10K reports. Tobin's Q is market value of equity (calculated as shares outstanding times share price) plus total assets less common equity and deferred taxes, all scaled by book value of assets. Fraction of rivals who use FCD is calculated as the number of firms with the same 3-digit SIC code who face exchange rate exposure and disclose the use currency swaps, forwards or options divided by the total number of firms with the same 3-digit SIC who face foreign exchange exposure. Firms are classified as belonging to the subsample 'Fraction of Rivals using FCD is low (high)' if less (more) than 14% of its competitors hedge. The 14% cutoff is used because, for the median firm in the sample, 14% of competitors facing exchange rate exposure use FCD. Differences in mean Q of FCD users and non users are given in the third row. Differences in mean Q of firms belonging to the 'high' and 'low' rival-FCD-use samples are given in the last column. Parentheses contain p-values.
FCD
Fraction of Rivals using FCD is
"low"
Fraction of Rivals using FCD is "high" This table displays the effect of FCD use on firm value for a sample of firms that face foreign exchange exposure. A firm is defined as having ex-ante exchange rate exposure if it discloses foreign assets, sales or income in the COMPUSTAT Geographic segment file, or discloses positive values of foreign currency adjustment, exchange rate effect, foreign income, or deferred foreign taxes in the annual COMPUSTAT files. The dependent variable is the natural log of Tobin's Q, which is calculated as market value of equity (calculated as shares outstanding times share price) plus total assets less common equity and deferred taxes, all scaled by book value of assets. FCD User dummy equals 1 if the firm disclosed the use of foreign currency swaps, options or forwards in its 1998-1999 10K reports and 0 otherwise. Fraction of rivals who use FCD is calculated as the number of firms with the same 3-digit SIC code who face exchange rate exposure and disclose the use currency swaps, forwards or options divided by the total number of firms with the same 3-digit SIC who face foreign exchange exposure. Size is the log of total assets. R&D Expense/Sales is Research and Development Expense divided by Net Sales. Long-term Debt Ratio is long-term debt divided by total assets. Multiple Segment Dummy equals one if the firm operates in more than one segment and zero otherwise. ROA is return on assets calculated as net income over total assets. The model is estimated using a Heckman (1979) two step to control for the self-selection of firms that choose to use FCD. The decision to use FCD is modeled as a function of firm size, leverage, research and development expense, foreign sales and managerial stock and option holdings. Industry indicator variables are based on Campbell (1996) . Lambda is the self-selection parameter. The coefficient on lambda indicates the prevalence of self-selection in the model. 
Panel
Table IV Logit Regression Estimates of the Likelihood of Using Foreign Currency Derivatives (FCD)
Logit regression estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a firm facing ex-ante exchange rate exposure uses currency derivatives and proxies for incentives to use derivatives. A firm is defined as having ex-ante exchange rate exposure if it discloses foreign assets, sales or income in the COMPUSTAT Geographic segment file, or discloses positive values of foreign currency adjustment, exchange rate effect, foreign income, or deferred foreign taxes in the annual COMPUSTAT files. Dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value one if a firm disclosed the use of foreign currency swaps, options or forwards in its 1998-1999 10K filings and zero otherwise. Fraction of rivals who use FCD is calculated as the number of firms with the same 3-digit SIC code who face exchange rate exposure and disclose the use currency swaps, forwards or options divided by the total number of firms with the same 3-digit SIC who face foreign exchange exposure. Relative Exposure is the firm's foreign exchange exposure relative to the industry and is calculated as firm foreign sales minus the 3-digit industry mean foreign sales all divided by assets. Size is the log of total assets. R&D Expense/Sales is research and development expense divided by net sales. Long-term Debt Ratio is long-term debt divided by total assets. Manager Stockholding is the market value of the shares owned by the executives of the company. Manager Optionholding is the Black-Scholes value of the options held by the executives of the company. NOL carryforwards/TA is the net operating loss carry forwards scaled by book value of assets. Institutional Ownership is the percentage of firm's stock held by institutional investors. Interest Rate Hedge dummy equals one if a firm discloses the use of interest rate derivatives in its 10K filings for the year 1998-1999 and zero otherwise. 
Panel
Table V Tobit Regression Estimates
Tobit regression estimates of the relation between the notional amount of foreign currency derivatives held by a firm that faces ex-ante exchange rate exposure and proxies for incentives to use derivatives. A firm is defined as having ex-ante exchange rate exposure if it discloses foreign assets, sales or income in the COMPUSTAT Geographic segment file, or discloses positive values of foreign currency adjustment, exchange rate effect, foreign income, or deferred foreign taxes in the annual COMPUSTAT files. Dependent variable is the total notional value of foreign exchange swaps, options and forwards disclosed the in the 1998-1999 10K filings divided by total assets. Fraction of rivals who use FCD is calculated as the number of firms with the same 3-digit SIC code who face exchange rate exposure and disclose the use currency swaps, forwards or options divided by the total number of firms with the same 3-digit SIC who face foreign exchange exposure. Amount of FCD used by rivals is the average contract (notional) value of derivatives contracts held by firms with the same 3-digit SIC code. Relative Exposure is the firm's foreign exchange exposure relative to the industry and is calculated as firm foreign sales minus the 3-digit industry mean foreign sales all divided by assets. Size is the log of total assets. R&D Expense/Sales is research and development expense divided by net sales. Long-term Debt Ratio is long-term debt divided by total assets. Manager Stockholding is the market value of the shares owned by the executives of the company. Manager Optionholding is the Black-Scholes value of the options held by the executives of the company. NOL carryforwards/TA is the net operating loss carry forwards scaled by book value of assets. Interest Rate Hedge dummy equals one if a firm discloses the use of interest rate derivatives in its 10K filings for the year 1998-1999 and zero otherwise. 
Panel
Table VI Foreign Currency Derivatives (FCD) Use and Firm Value for High and Low Institutional Ownership Sub-Samples
This table displays the effect of FCD use on firm value for firms that face foreign exchange exposure and have either a high or low institution ownership. A firm is defined as having ex-ante exchange rate exposure if it discloses foreign assets, sales or income in the COMPUSTAT Geographic segment file, or discloses positive values of foreign currency adjustment, exchange rate effect, foreign income, or deferred foreign taxes in the annual COMPUSTAT files. A firm is classified into the Low (High) institutional sub sample if institutional ownership is below (above) the sample median. The dependent variable is the natural log of Tobin's Q, which is calculated as market value of equity (calculated as shares outstanding times share price) plus total assets less common equity and deferred taxes, all scaled by book value of assets. FCD User dummy equals 1 if the firm disclosed the use of foreign currency swaps, options or forwards in its 1998-1999 10K reports and 0 otherwise. Fraction of rivals who use FCD is calculated as the number of firms with the same 3-digit SIC code who face exchange rate exposure and disclose the use currency swaps, forwards or options divided by the total number of firms with the same 3-digit SIC who face foreign exchange exposure. Size is the log of total assets. R&D Expense/Sales is research and development expense divided by net sales. Long-term Debt Ratio is long-term debt divided by total assets. Multiple Segment Dummy equals one if the firm operates in more than one segment and zero otherwise. ROA is return on assets calculated as net income over total assets. The model is estimated using a Heckman (1979) two step to control for the self-selection of firms that choose to use FCD. The decision to use FCD is modeled as a function of firm size, leverage, research and development expense, foreign sales and managerial stock and option holdings. Lambda is the self-selection parameter. The coefficient on lambda indicates the prevalence of self-selection in the model. 
Table VII Foreign Currency Derivatives (FCD) Use and Firm Value for High and Low Portfolio Sensitivity Samples
This table displays the effect of FCD use on firm value for two samples of firms that face foreign exchange exposure. The Low Portfolio Sensitivity sample contains all non users of FCD and only those FCD users whose portfolio sensitivity is below the median. The High Portfolio Sensitivity sample contains all non users of FCD and only those FCD users whose portfolio sensitivity is above the median. Portfolio sensitivity is the market value sensitivity of an FCD user's currency derivatives portfolio and is calculated as in Guay and Kothari (2003) . A firm has ex-ante exchange rate exposure if it discloses foreign assets, sales or income in the COMPUSTAT Geographic segment file, or discloses positive values of foreign currency adjustment, exchange rate effect, foreign income, or deferred foreign taxes in the annual COMPUSTAT files. The dependent variable is the natural log of Tobin's Q, which is calculated as market value of equity (calculated as shares outstanding times share price) plus total assets less common equity and deferred taxes, all scaled by book value of assets. FCD User dummy equals 1 if the firm disclosed the use of foreign currency swaps, options or forwards in its 1998-1999 10K reports and 0 otherwise. Fraction of rivals who use FCD is calculated as the number of firms with the same 3-digit SIC code who face exchange rate exposure and disclose the use currency swaps, forwards or options divided by the total number of firms with the same 3-digit SIC who face foreign exchange exposure. Size is the log of total assets. R&D Expense/Sales is research and development expense divided by net sales. Long-term Debt Ratio is long-term debt divided by total assets. Multiple Segment Dummy equals one if the firm operates in more than one segment and zero otherwise. ROA is return on assets calculated as net income over total assets. The model is estimated using a Heckman (1979) two step to control for the self-selection of firms that choose to use FCD. The decision to use FCD is modeled as a function of firm size, leverage, research and development expense, foreign sales and managerial stock and option holdings. Lambda is the self-selection parameter. The coefficient on lambda indicates the prevalence of self-selection in the model. Logit regression estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a firm facing ex-ante exchange rate exposure uses currency derivatives and proxies for incentives to use derivatives after controlling for industry characteristics. A firm is defined as having ex-ante exchange rate exposure if it discloses foreign assets, sales or income in the COMPUSTAT Geographic segment file, or discloses positive values of foreign currency adjustment, exchange rate effect, foreign income, or deferred foreign taxes in the annual COMPUSTAT files. Dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value one if a firm disclosed the use of foreign currency swaps, options or forwards in its 1998-1999 10K filings and zero otherwise. Fraction of rivals who use FCD is calculated as the number of firms with the same 3-digit SIC code who face exchange rate exposure and disclose the use currency swaps, forwards or options divided by the total number of firms with the same 3-digit SIC who face foreign exchange exposure. Relative Exposure is the firm's foreign exchange exposure relative to the industry and is calculated as firm foreign sales minus the 3-digit industry mean foreign sales all divided by assets. Size is the log of total assets. R&D Expense/Sales is research and development expense divided by net sales. Long-term Debt Ratio is long-term debt divided by total assets. Manager Stockholding is the market value of the shares owned by the executives of the company. Manager Optionholding is the Black-Scholes value of the options held by the executives of the company. NOL carryforwards/TA is the net operating loss carry forwards scaled by book value of assets. Interest Rate Hedge dummy equals one if a firm discloses the use of interest rate derivatives in its 10K filings for the year 1998-1999. 
